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Relationship between Corporate Governance Score and Stock Prices: Evidence 
from KSE- 30 Index Companies 
 
Saif Ullah Malik* 
 
Abstract 
 
The price of stock like any other commodity goes up and down due to a number of factors. Corporate governance 
is one of important determinants of stock price. This paper makes an attempt to study exclusively the relationship 
between corporate governance score and stock prices of a company. The research involves a study of the KSE - 
30 index companies. The independent variable (Corporate governance score) and dependent variable (company’s 
share price) have identified for the two years 2009 and 2010. In the analysis our hypothesis corporate 
governance score and stock prices is significant. Hence, this study concludes that better governed firms have 
higher stock prices and vice versa. This is due to the fact that better managed firms will perform better and as 
result stock prices will increase.  
 
Key words: Corporate governance, Stock Prices, Board Independence, Expertise of Audit committee, 
Remuneration Committee, Nomination Committee, CEO Duality, Existence of Audit committee  
 
1. Introduction 
 
A series of debacles like Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco etc. enforced organizations all over the world to outline 
strict guidelines for corporate governance (Samontaray, 2010, Shil, 2008 & Wu, 2005) While Benz and Frey, 
(2007) claimed that these corporate governance mechanisms have failed to prevent these debacles). These 
developments have taken place globally in terms of political, technical & social issues (Samontaray, 2010) but 
have been reproduced in the Pakistani corporate world with some necessary changes. However, corporate 
governance in South Asia is not as developed like in the U.S. or UK (Shil, 2008). The International Monetary 
Fund has demanded that governance improvements should be included in its debt relief program (as Pakistan is 
major beneficiary of IMF debt relief program). In 1998, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) issued its influential OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which are proposed to 
assist members and non-member countries in their efforts to calculate and develop the lawful, institutional and 
regulatory structure for better corporate governance (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, and Zhang, 2003). 
 
In 2002 the Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has headed for the idea of establishing a 
framework of good corporate governance whereby a listed company is managed in compliance with best practices 
of corporate governance and in exercise of the powers granted by sub-section (4) of section 34 of the Securities 
and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (XVII of 1969).  The main development in the field of Corporate Governance in 
Pakistan is the formation of “Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance” in December 2004. This institution is in 
its growing stage and should help improve the governance practices being followed in the country (Mubbashir, 
2009). Yasser, Entebang and Mansor, (2011) defined corporate governance as “the mode through which entities 
are managed and governed”. Corporate governance is an important idea that relates to the way in which financial 
resources available to an organization are judiciously used to achieve the overall corporate objective of an 
organization. It keeps the organization in business and creates a greater scene for future opportunities.  
 
Globally, every country has its own set of rules and regulations such as in some countries this may take the form 
of laws, as guidelines or social norms. According to Gulzar and Wang, (2010) good corporate governance is very 
important for the continuity and sustainability of the businesses that maintain economic growth. Besides the board 
of directors, more non-executive and independent directors, board committees, bylaws and company codes should 
be introduced in a company. Corporate governance will ensure transparency to satisfy different stakeholders such 
as suppliers, customers, and creditors. The main objective of corporate governance is to encourage accountability, 
transparency, fairness, disclosure and responsibility which are core values for the success of all businesses.  
 
___________ 
 
*The author is a student of M.Phil at Institute of Business Management (IoBM) Karachi, Pakistan. All errors and 
omissions are the author‟s own and do not constitute those of the institute.  
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Karachi stock market is one of the leading emerging markets in the world. In Pakistan most businesses are 
dominated by families where ownership concentration is high which results in weak investor‟s protection and 
corporate law enforcement like many other developing countries (Shaheen & Nishat, 2005). Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) is the oldest and biggest stock exchange of Pakistan. It has been declared as the “Best 
performing stock market of the world for the year 2002”. The Karachi Stock Exchange comprises of four indices, 
viz, KSE- 30 Index, KSE 100 Index, KMI and KSE All Share Index (www.kse.com).  
 
According to Yasser, Entebang and Mansor, (2011) KSE-30 Index is a standard by which the stock price 
performance can be compared over a period of time. In particular, the KSE-30 Index is designed to provide 
investors with the wisdom of how a large company‟s shares on the Pakistan‟s equity market are performing. Thus, 
the KSE-30 Index will be similar to other indicators that follow different sectors of a country‟s economic activity 
such as the gross national product, consumer price index, etc. KSE-30 index is calculated using the “Free-Float 
Market Capitalization” methodology. In accordance with this methodology, the level of index at any point of time 
shows the free-float market value of 30 companies in relation to the base period. The free-float methodology 
refers to an index construction methodology that takes into account only the market capitalization of free-float 
shares of a company for the reason of index calculation. Free-float methodology improves index flexibility in 
terms of inclusion of any stock from all the listed stocks. This improves market coverage and sector coverage of 
the index. 
 
2. Objectives of the study 
 
This paper makes an attempt to study whether corporate governance scores have a relationship with the stock 
price of a company. The price of stock like any other commodity goes up and down due to a number of factors 
such as sales, EPS, Net Fixed Assets, corporate governance and many other economic variables. However, this 
paper will only analyze relationship of corporate governance score with stock price. Firstly, the relationship 
between total corporate governance score and stock prices will be measured. Secondly, the relationship of stock 
prices with the components of corporate governance (e.g. board independence, expertise of Audit Committee, 
Remuneration Committee, Nomination Committee, CEO Duality, existence of Audit committee and Frequency of 
audit committee meeting) will be measured. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
According to Yasser, (2011) the “word Governance comes from the Greek word kybernan, meaning to steer, 
guide or govern”. In larger terms, governance is the act of governing. It refers to the relationship between the 
governors and the governed, like the government and the people in a democracy. In other word the decision-
making powers are transferred by individuals to those in authority so that the common interests of the country can 
be served. Off course the ship of state needs a competent captain and team to guide it but it also has to have a 
clear vision of where it is, where it is going, and how well it is progressing. So governance mechanisms are 
planned for these purposes. 
 
Fremond and Capaul (2002) defined corporate governance as “property rights of shareholders and the 
mechanisms of exercising such rights”. They further argued that “equity rights are complex property rights”. But 
these depend on profit of the company and its distribution. Corporate governance deals with the ways in which the 
rights of the corporation‟s external equity finance providers are protected and they receive a reasonable return. 
Further this reduces the risk of exploitation of outsiders by insiders and thereby reduces the cost of capital for 
issuers. While Shaheen & Nishat, (2005) consider it the practice and arrangement through which a firm‟s business 
is run with the final objective of increasing shareholder‟s wealth. 
 
Shareholder rights differ in different firms and an increase in shareholder rights had higher firm value. According 
to Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, (2003) corporations are like republics. The final authority lies with 
shareholders. These shareholders elect directors who delegate most decisions to managers. As in any republic, the 
real power-sharing link depends upon the particular rules of governance and this power-sharing relationship 
between investors and managers is defined by the rules of corporate governance. In turn, higher firm value will 
result in higher stock prices. This relationship should encourage those practices which protect share-holders from 
managerial self-interest by providing incentives for executives to manage firms in the shareholders' long-term 
interests (Daily, Dalton, Albert and Cannella, 2003). However, in practice directors are often more loyal to 
corporate officers than to the shareholders (Khan, Nemati and Iftikhar, 2011). 
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According to Christopher, Rufus and Ezekiel, (2009), demand and supply factors are the most basic factors that 
influence price of shares. Government policies, firm‟s and industry‟s performance and potentials have an impact 
on demand behavior of investors, both in the primary and secondary markets. The factors affecting the price of an 
equity share can be divided into the macro and micro economic outlook. Macro economic factors are politics, 
general economic conditions such as how the economy is performing and government regulations, etc. The micro 
factors are the performance and management of the company.  
 
Researchers like Samontaray, (2010) categorized factors affecting share price into three main classes i.e. global 
factors, domestic factors and local company specific factors. While Khan et al (2011) categorized these factors 
into two groups i.e. internal factors defined by the officers or stockholders, and the outside forces such as 
consumer groups and government regulations. Satisfactory corporate governance systems in a country can be 
formed if the following four steps are taken as proposed by Megginson (2000): (1) changes in corporate and 
securities laws, (2) strengthening the listing and disclosure requirements for stock exchanges, (3) independent 
judiciary, and (4) establishing a regulatory body capable of balancing the challenging claims of managers, outside 
shareholders, and creditors.  Corporate governance is not only about election of directors who will make decisions 
on behalf of shareholders but it is the means of accountability of management (shah et al, 2009).This effort can 
benefit at large, but in case of failures penalties are also there such as debacles like Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco 
which resulted in economic failure (Javid and Iqbal 2010) while Wu, (2005) points out that poor corporate 
governance also breeds corruption (which is a common problem in Pakistan). 
 
The corporate governance mechanisms used to ensure economic efficiency include shareholder monitoring, 
creditor monitoring, executive remuneration contracts, dividend policy and the regulatory framework of the 
corporate law regime and the stock exchanges. The increasing international integration, deregulation and 
technological developments and the resulting challenges are demanding for a review of national corporate 
governance systems. Countries that are in terrible need of external financing require stronger and efficient 
corporate governance systems. Pakistan‟s failure to attract external finance from foreign investors may be mostly 
due to weak investor protection (Chaudary, Goergen, and Syed, 2006).  
 
Legal reforms and voluntary codes of corporate governance are flourishing around the world but in general the 
effect of corporate governance on the firm‟s value remains unclear (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006).The dimensions 
of legal reforms are: (i) firms that have good governance practices, may have high market value (Black et al,2005 
& Strenger,2005). (ii) firms may choose different governance practices (Black, 2001) .(iii) firms may adopt good 
governance rules to signal that the firm‟s insiders will behave well, but in this case the signal, not the firm‟s 
governance practices, affects share prices (Black et al, 2006). Share prices are the trading prices for minority 
shares (Black et al, 2006 & Black et al, 2005).  
 
Black et al, (2006) claimed that there is no strong evidence that better-governed firms are more profitable or pay 
higher dividends. It is, however, the investors who value the same earnings or the same current dividends more 
highly for better-governed firms due to less risk. Corporate Governance practice provides a means to know the 
dream of justify risks and optimize performance at the same time in today‟s strong regulatory setting. It is evident 
that if corporate governance is material for a firm‟s  performance and this relationship is fully integrated by the 
stock market, then stock price should rapidly correct to any relevant change in the firm's governance (Gompers et 
al, 2003).Corporate Governance lays down an outline for  creating long-term trust between company and its 
stakeholders (Samontaray, 2010). Shaheen and Nishat, (2005) claimed that poorly governed firms (i.e., those with 
low Governance Scores) have lower valuations, while better-governed firms have higher valuations. So, on the 
basis of above literature we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between corporate governance score and stock prices of the company. 
 
3.1 Components of Corporate Governance 
 
3.1.1 Board independence  
 
According to Yasser et al, (2011) Corporate Governance indices grant higher ratings to firms with independent 
boards. However they claimed that relationship between the percentage of outside directors and a firm‟s 
performance is mixed. In Pakistan, Code of Corporate Governance has certain restriction regarding limited 
companies viz., that executive Directors must not be more than 75% of total board size; also the representation of 
minority shareholders and independent directors be encouraged.  
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Corporate Governance Codes recommend that boards should be between 5 to 16 depending on the size and 
diversification of the organization. According to Gulzar and Wang, (2010) the board shall have a realistic number 
of members and should be comprised of executive and non-executive directors (including an independent non-
executive director) to help effective and objective board management. According to Ghani and Ashraf (2005), a 
number of empirical studies proposed that business groups, as an organizational form, are more prone to inclusion 
of minority shareholders. Hence, on the basis of above facts, independent directors safeguard interest of minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders. So board independence will have a positive impact on the performance of a 
company which will subsequently have a positive relationship with the stock prices of the company. Hence, our 
second hypothesis will be 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between independence of board of directors and stock prices of the company. 
 
3.1.2 CEO Duality 
 
According to Javed and Iqbal (2007) the separation of roles of CEO and chairman weaken the powers of the CEO 
and increase the board‟s ability to appropriately perform the oversight judgment. It also critically assesses 
executive directors and the presence of non-executive members on the board reduces the power of management 
on the board. Moreover a higher ratio of outside directors on the board leads to higher company performance. A 
large group of directors would require more time and effort on the part of CEO to agree to a certain action. 
Therefore, if the board is large, its independence is increased in the sense that the CEO‟s ability to influence is 
diluted and it is more difficult for the CEO to dominate the board. Hence, on the basis of the above facts 
separation of role of CEO and chairman safeguard interests of minority shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Therefore, separation of roles of the CEO and the chairman will have a positive impact on stock prices of the 
company. Hence, our third hypothesis will be 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between separation of CEO and chairman with stock prices of the company.   
 
3.1.3 Existence of Remuneration and Nomination Committees  
 
According to Yasser, (2011) some companies either does not hold AGMs or they are held at far off venues. Also, 
many companies do not distribute company profit to shareholders. The decision about selection of company 
executives and fixation of their remuneration is at the discretion of the board but decisions about selection of audit 
firms with the recommendation of audit committee is in the hands of shareholders. For better governance these 
matter should be approved on the recommendation of respective committees like the remuneration and 
nomination committee. Hence, on the basis of the above facts, these committees safeguard the interests of 
minority shareholders and other stakeholders. So, remuneration and nomination committees will have a positive 
impact on stock prices of the company. Hence, our fourth and fifth hypotheses will be 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between Existence of Remuneration Committee and stock prices of the 
company.  
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between Existence of Nomination Committee and stock prices of the company. 
 
3.1.4 Existence and Expertise of Audit Committee 
 
According to Yasser et al, (2011) the audit committee is responsible for recommending the appointment of 
external auditor(s), their removal and their remuneration to board of directors. 
The committee has the following main objectives: 
1. Determining the proper measures to protect company‟s assets. 
2. Reviewing the quarterly and annual financial statements of the Company, before approval by the board of 
directors. 
3. Determining the scope of the audit and assisting external auditors and coordinating with internal and external 
auditors. 
4. Determining the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control systems including financial and operational 
control, accounting systems and reporting structure. 
5. Maintaining compliance with relevant statutory requirements. 
6. Maintaining compliance with the best practices of corporate governance.  
Hence, on the basis of above important functions performed by audit committees, the existence, expertise and 
frequency of audit committees meetings will have a positive relationship with the stock prices of the company. 
Hence, our sixth, seventh and eighth hypotheses will be 
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H6: There is a positive relationship between Existence of Audit committee and stock prices of the company. 
H7: There is a positive relationship between Expertise of Audit committee and stock prices of the company. 
H8: There is a positive relationship between Frequency of audit committee and stock prices of the company. 
 
4. Research Design and Methodology 
 
4.1 Sample 
The research involves a study of the thirty (30) companies included in the KSE 30 index. For the purpose of this 
study the independent variable (Corporate governance score) and the dependent variable (company‟s share price) 
have been identified for the year 2009 and 2010 and a total of sixty (60) observations were analyzed.  
 
4.2 Data Source and Data Type 
The Annual reports of the chosen companies for the year 2009 and 2010 were collected and corporate governance 
questionnaire filled and for every “yes” one (1) mark was added while a “No” is consider as Zero. Thus the total 
governance score was calculated for each company and the Share price of these same companies for the period 
was collected.  
 
4.3 Corporate Governance Measure 
Corporate governance is taken from Sawicki, (2009). A questionnaire is comprises of total of nine questions 
relating to one question each for board independence, Expertise of Audit committee, Remuneration Committee, 
Nomination Committee, CEO Duality, existence of Audit committee, Frequency of audit committee meeting is 
measured, big audit firm and shareholder owner ship. Big audit firm is deleted from analysis as all answer were 
yes. 
 
4.4 Share Price 
The share price has been taken as a dependent variable; therefore, it is necessary that appropriate share price value 
should be taken for the analysis. As proposed by Samontaray, (2010) for this purpose a broad calculation of share 
price was taken. At first, daily closing share price of each company was taken. 
Annual Average Share Price = Sum of daily closing Share Price/Number of Days Share is traded 
 
4.5 Methodology 
According to objectives of the study firstly, a relationship between total corporate governance score and stock 
prices is measured. Secondly, the relationship of stock prices with component of corporate governance (e.g. board 
independence, Expertise of Audit committee, Remuneration Committee, Nomination Committee, CEO Duality, 
existence of Audit committee and Freq. of audit committee is measured. Hence, corporate governance score will 
be calculated as: 
 
Corporate Governance Score (CGS) = Board independence + Expertise of Audit committee + Existence of 
Remuneration Committee + Existence of Nomination Committee + CEO Duality + Existence of Audit committee 
+ Freq. of audit committee 
 
5 Results 
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6 Table I: Correlation 
 
Pearson Correlation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Stock Prices 1          
Corporate Governance Score .713
**
 1         
Board Independence .220 .400
**
 1        
CEO Duality .006 -.161 -.292
*
 1       
Shareholder Ownership .151 .383
**
 .180 -.616
**
 1      
Existence of Audit Committee .122 .329
*
 .135 -.039 .024 1     
Freq. of Audit Committee Meeting .175 .427
**
 -.183 -.118 .073 .332
**
 1    
Expertise of Audit Committee .551
**
 .582
**
 -.154 -.211 .442
**
 .055 .165 1   
Existence of Remuneration 
Committee 
.478
**
 .726
**
 .031 -.040 .174 .139 .419
**
 .393
**
 1  
Existence of Nomination Committee .618** .712** .342** -.197 .284* .085 .043 .438** .248 1 
 
Table II: Regression analysis 
                                                 Model Summary
b 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin- 
Watson R Square 
Change 
F Change 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .713
a
 .508 .499 67.06569 .508 59.827 .000 2.343 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Corporate Governance Score 
b. Dependent Variable: Stock Prices 
 
Table III: ANOVA
b
  
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 269090.832 1 269090.832 59.827 .000
a
 
Residual 260872.768 58 4497.806   
Total 529963.600 59    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Corporate Governance Score 
b. Dependent Variable: Stock Prices 
 
Table IV: Coefficients
a 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -163.226 36.144  -4.516 .000 
Corporate Governance 
Score 
51.212 6.621 .713 7.735 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Stock Prices 
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Table V: Component wise Regression analysis, Model Summary
b
 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin- 
Watson R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .780a .608 .547 63.79922 .608 9.900 .000 2.506 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Existence of Nomination Committee, Freq. of Audit Committee Meeting, CEO Duality, 
Existence of Audit Committee, Expertise of Audit Committee, Existence of Remuneration Committee, Board 
Independence, Shareholder Ownership 
b. Dependent Variable: Stock Prices 
 
Table VII: Component wise ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 322376.230 8 40297.029 9.900 .000
a
 
Residual 207587.370 51 4070.341   
Total 529963.600 59    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Existence of Nomination Committee, Freq. of Audit Committee Meeting, 
CEO Duality, Existence of Audit Committee, Expertise of Audit Committee, Existence of 
Remuneration Committee, Board Independence, Shareholder Ownership 
b. Dependent Variable: Stock Prices 
Table VIII: Component wise Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -44.255 75.314  -.588 .559 
Board Independence 46.228 21.227 .246 2.178 .034 
CEO Duality 64.255 40.023 .189 1.605 .115 
Shareholder Ownership -57.086 64.204 -.109 -.889 .378 
Existence of Audit 
Committee 
-7.984 70.169 -.011 -.114 .910 
Freq. of Audit Committee 
Meeting 
22.579 29.980 .082 .753 .455 
Expertise of Audit 
Committee 
111.723 32.257 .424 3.463 .001 
Existence of Remuneration 
Committee 
39.035 20.171 .207 1.935 .059 
Existence of Nomination 
Committee 
74.259 22.597 .362 3.286 .002 
a. Dependent Variable: Stock Prices 
 
6. Empirical Results Discussion  
 
Cross-sectional regression analysis using SPSS 17 is used in this study. The first analysis is based on a correlation 
table which establishes the relationship between variables. Our correlation results show that corporate governance 
has 0.713 correlations at sig level .000 with stock prices which mean 71.3% correlation with each other. 
According to Samontaray, (2010) correlation of above 0.5 will show that the two variables have a high correlation 
and hence are dependent upon each other.  
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It should be noted that under such conditions the p-value must be less than 0.05 (to have significant dependency). 
This indicates the fact that independent variables are independent in a true sense. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the independent variables (i.e., corporate governance score) and between dependent 
variables (i.e., share price) were less than 0.90, indicating the data are not affected by serious co linearity problem 
(Hair et al., 1998). Component wise analysis shows that expertise of audit committee, existence of remuneration 
committee and existence of nomination committee has positive significant relationship with correlation of .551, 
.478 and .618 respectively at a significant level of .000 while board independence, CEO duality, shareholder 
ownership and existence of audit committee are not significant.  
 
Then it is analyzed whether the model is fit or not to use. According to Samontaray, (2010) „R‟ is the multiple 
correlation coefficients, that is, the correlation between the observed and predicted values of the dependent 
variable. A high „R‟ value will mean that relationship is stronger. On the other hand, R squared is the magnitude 
of variation in the dependent variable explained by the regression model. Also, adjusted R squared tries to correct 
R squared to more closely show the goodness of fit of the model in the population. If R squared and Adjusted R 
squared is close to each other, it shows better model fit. In our study it has been found that we have R square 
value more than 0.5 and adjusted R square value is close to R square value. This proves that data is fit to be used 
and the model that has been chosen for it is equally fit. In our model summary we take the total score of corporate 
governance as independent variable while stock prices as dependent variable. Main variable corporate governance 
has R squared .595 which means that corporate governance has 59.5% impact on stock prices and Adjusted R 
squared value is .499 which is close to R squared value. This level of predictability is low but we know stock 
prices are also affected by many variables. However, in this analysis we are taking only corporate governance 
excessively. So this level of predictability is sufficient. Component wise analysis has R squared value of .608 and 
adjusted R squared value as .547 
 
In the ANOVA table, it can be seen that the regression sum of squares is more than residual sum of squares in 
corporate governance.  According to Samontaray, (2010) a model with a large regression sum of squares in 
comparison to the residual sum of squares indicates that the model accounts for most of the variation in the 
dependent variable. Also, if the significant value of the F statistic is small (smaller than say 0.05) then the 
independent  variables  do  a  excellent job  explaining  the  variation  in  the  dependent  variable.  As the 
independent variables are measured in different parts, the standardized coefficients are efforts to make the 
regression coefficients more comparable. In our analysis our main hypothesis regarding corporate governance and 
stock prices has 59.827 F value at significant level .000 while component wise analysis has 9.900 F value at 
significant level of .000 
 
According to Samontaray, (2010) for better comparison and analysis, t statistics should be used. The t statistics 
helps in finding the relative importance of each variable in the model. Any t value more than 2 and less than -2 is 
considered as useful predictors of the variable in the model. In our analysis our main hypothesis regarding 
corporate governance score and stock prices has 7.735 t value at significant level .000 which is very high and 
acceptable while our component wise analysis board independence has 2.178 t value at sig level .034, CEO 
duality has 1.604 at sig level .115, shareholder owner ship has -.889 at sig level .378, existence of audit committee 
has -.114 at sig level .910, Freq. of audit committee meeting has .753 at sig level .001, existence of remuneration 
committee has 1.935 at sig level .059 and existence of nomination committee has 3.286 at sig level .002. 
 
There is no specific study on this topic in Pakistan; however, this study confirmed the finding of a number of 
studies. Samontaray, (2010) conducted study in India and found significant relationship between share price 
(dependent variable) and corporate governance score (independent variables) using cross-sectional regression 
analysis. This study also confirmed this positive relationship between corporate governance score and stock 
prices. Bai et al, (2003) found that both factors i.e. a large holding by the largest shareholder and the CEO being 
the chairman or vice chairman of the board of directors, have negative effects on share prices but our study 
contradict these results. The reason may be that Pakistani companies are dominated by large shareholders, hence 
our data did not show the relationship with stock prices as our majority answer was “no”. in our study for every 
no there was zero mark hence, sample did not show relationship with stock prices. The CEO being the chairman 
or vice chairman of the board of directors is also not significant. 
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This study also confirmed the findings of following studies. Black, (2001) examined the relationship between 
corporate governance behavior and market value for a sample of 21 Russian firms and suggested that corporate 
governance behavior has a powerful effect on market value in a country where legal and cultural constraints on 
corporate behavior are weak. This study also confirmed above mentioned finding. Black, (2006) found a causal 
relationship between an overall governance index and higher share prices in emerging markets, however, this 
study only analyze simple relationship. They also found that Korean firms with 50% outside directors have 0.13 
higher Tobin's q (roughly 40% higher share price), after controlling for the rest of KCGI. They report the first 
evidence consistent with greater board independence, thus causally predicting higher share prices in emerging 
markets. Black, love and Rachinsky, (2005) found increasing evidence that broad measures of firm-level 
corporate governance predict higher share prices. They found an economically important and statistically strong 
correlation between governance and market value both in OLS and in fixed effects regressions with firm-index 
fixed effects. Gompers et al, (2003) created G-Index; a summary measure of corporate governance based on 24 
firm-specific provisions, and showed that more democratic firms are more valuable. This study also finds that 
firms should be run more democratically through committees. 
 
7. Research Findings and Conclusion 
 
 Corporate Governance as significant variable: Corporate governance is significantly related with the share 
prices of a company hence, we will accept our Hypothesis H1. 
 Board Independence as non significant variable:  Board independence is not significantly related with the 
share price of a company and hence, we will reject our Hypothesis H2. 
 CEO duality as non significant variable:  CEO duality has not significantly affected the share price of a 
company and hence has been indifferent to their share price value as in our sample majority of companies have 
a separate CEO and Chairman so, results show indifferent behavior. Hence, we will reject our Hypothesis H3. 
 Existence of Remuneration Committee as significant variable:  Existence of Remuneration Committee is 
significantly related to the share price of a company and hence, we will accept Hypothesis H4. 
 Existence of Nomination Committee as significant variable:  Existence of Nomination Committee is 
significantly related with the share price of a company and hence, we will accept Hypothesis H5. 
 Existence of Audit Committee as non significant variable: Audit committee has not significantly affected the 
share price of these listed companies hence we will reject Hypothesis H6. 
 Expertise of Audit committee as significant variable: Expertise of Audit committee is significantly related 
with the share price of a company and hence, we will accept Hypothesis H7. 
 Frequency of audit committee as non significant variable: Frequency of audit committee is not significantly 
related to the share price of these listed companies hence, we will reject Hypothesis H8. 
 
This is clear from the above result that corporate governance is a very important determinant of stock prices of the 
firms. Those firms who want to enhance their stock prices should implement governance reforms. Higher 
corporate governance score will lead to higher firm valuation and higher stock prices and vice versa. This is due 
to the fact that better managed firms will perform better and as result stock prices will increase. This also show 
investor confidence in the firm as, if proper corporate governance mechanism is implemented investor feel greater 
confidence and risk of firm will reduce. 
 
8. Limitations of study 
 
As mentioned in the introduction stock prices have many determinants of which corporate governance is one of 
them. In most studies many variables are taken but this study exclusively analyzes the relationship between 
corporate governance and stock prices. However, many other important determinants of stock price are not taken 
in this study. 
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Appendix: A 
 
Sr. 
# 
Name Sr. # Name Sr. # Name 
1 OGDCL 11 ABL 21 Bank Al-Falah 
2 PPL 12 PSO 22 Millat Tractors Ltd 
3 MCB 13 HUB 23 Adamjee Insurance  
4 HBL 14 KAPCO 24 D.G Khan cement Company 
5 NBP 15 FFC BIN QASIM 25 INDUS MOTORS 
6 FFC 16 BANK AL HABIB 26 Jahangir Siddique & Co. 
7 UBL 17 APL 27 Attock refinary ltd 
8 POL 18 NRL 28 Arif habib ltd 
9 PTCL 19 LUCKY CEMENT 29 Mari gas company ltd 
10 ENGRO 20 NISHAT MILLS 30 Nishat (chunian) Ltd. 
 
